Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/867

Enhancing the Performance of Practical Profiling Side-Channel Attacks Using Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks

Ping Wang and Ping Chen and Zhimin Luo and Gaofeng Dong and Mengce Zheng and Nenghai Yu and Honggang Hu

Abstract: Recently, many profiling side-channel attacks based on Machine Learning and Deep Learning have been proposed. Most of them focus on reducing the number of traces required for successful attacks by optimizing the modeling algorithms. In previous work, relatively sufficient traces need to be used for training a model. However, in the practical profiling phase, it is difficult or impossible to collect sufficient traces due to the constraint of various resources. In this case, the performance of profiling attacks is inefficient even if proper modeling algorithms are used. In this paper, the main problem we consider is how to conduct more efficient profiling attacks when sufficient profiling traces cannot be obtained. To deal with this problem, we first introduce the Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN) in the context of side-channel attacks. We show that CGAN can generate new traces to enlarge the size of the profiling set, which improves the performance of profiling attacks. For both unprotected and protected cryptographic algorithms, we find that CGAN can effectively learn the leakage of traces collected in their implementations. We also apply it to different modeling algorithms. In our experiments, the model constructed with the augmented profiling set can reduce the required attack traces by more than half, which means the generated traces can provide useful information as the real traces.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Profiling side-channel attacks, CGAN, Generated traces, Leakage learning, Insufficient profiling set

Date: received 10 Jul 2020

Contact author: mczheng at mail ustc edu cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200712:125518 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/867


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