Paper 2020/839

Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for IoT, or When SAKE$^+$ Turns Out to Be SAKE$^-$

Loïc Ferreira

Abstract

In this paper we make an extensive analysis of SAKE$^+$ and SAKE$^+$-AM, two key exchange protocols. We show that several attacks are practicable against these protocols. This invalidates several claims made by the authors regarding the (security) properties of their protocols. Our results question also the correctness of the corresponding security proofs, made in the computational model (using the game-based methodology), and with the ProVerif verification tool.

Note: Minor changes

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Authenticated key agreementCryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
loic ferreira @ orange com
History
2020-08-04: revised
2020-07-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/839
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/839,
      author = {Loïc Ferreira},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for IoT, or When SAKE$^+$ Turns Out to Be SAKE$^-$},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/839},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/839}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/839}
}
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