Paper 2020/839
Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for IoT, or When SAKE$^+$ Turns Out to Be SAKE$^-$
Loïc Ferreira
Abstract
In this paper we make an extensive analysis of SAKE$^+$ and SAKE$^+$-AM, two key exchange protocols. We show that several attacks are practicable against these protocols. This invalidates several claims made by the authors regarding the (security) properties of their protocols. Our results question also the correctness of the corresponding security proofs, made in the computational model (using the game-based methodology), and with the ProVerif verification tool.
Note: Minor changes
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Authenticated key agreementCryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- loic ferreira @ orange com
- History
- 2020-08-04: revised
- 2020-07-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/839
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/839,
author = {Loïc Ferreira},
title = {Cryptanalysis of a ``Strengthened'' Key Exchange Protocol for {IoT}, or When {SAKE}$^+$ Turns Out to Be {SAKE}$^-$},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/839},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/839}
}
