Paper 2020/742

Improved Side-Channel Resistance by Dynamic Fault-Injection Countermeasures

Jan Richter-Brockmann and Tim Güneysu

Abstract

Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as serious threats to cryptographic hardware implementations and the combined protection against both is currently an open line of research. A promising countermeasure with considerable implementation overhead appears to be a mix of first-order secure Threshold Implementations and linear Error-Correcting Codes. In this paper we employ for the first time the inherent structure of non-systematic codes as fault countermeasure which dynamically mutates the applied generator matrices to achieve a higher-order side-channel and fault-protected design. As a case study, we apply our scheme to the PRESENT block cipher that do not show any higher-order side-channel leakage after measuring 150 million power traces.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The 31st IEEE International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors
Keywords
FIASCAcombined countermeasurehidingrecon&#64257guration
Contact author(s)
jan richter-brockmann @ rub de
History
2020-06-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/742
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/742,
      author = {Jan Richter-Brockmann and Tim Güneysu},
      title = {Improved Side-Channel Resistance by Dynamic Fault-Injection Countermeasures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/742},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/742}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/742}
}
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