Paper 2020/742
Improved Side-Channel Resistance by Dynamic Fault-Injection Countermeasures
Jan Richter-Brockmann and Tim Güneysu
Abstract
Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as serious threats to cryptographic hardware implementations and the combined protection against both is currently an open line of research. A promising countermeasure with considerable implementation overhead appears to be a mix of first-order secure Threshold Implementations and linear Error-Correcting Codes. In this paper we employ for the first time the inherent structure of non-systematic codes as fault countermeasure which dynamically mutates the applied generator matrices to achieve a higher-order side-channel and fault-protected design. As a case study, we apply our scheme to the PRESENT block cipher that do not show any higher-order side-channel leakage after measuring 150 million power traces.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The 31st IEEE International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors
- Keywords
- FIASCAcombined countermeasurehidingreconfiguration
- Contact author(s)
- jan richter-brockmann @ rub de
- History
- 2020-06-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/742
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/742,
author = {Jan Richter-Brockmann and Tim Güneysu},
title = {Improved Side-Channel Resistance by Dynamic Fault-Injection Countermeasures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/742},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/742}
}
