Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/742

Improved Side-Channel Resistance by Dynamic Fault-Injection Countermeasures

Jan Richter-Brockmann and Tim GŁneysu

Abstract: Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as serious threats to cryptographic hardware implementations and the combined protection against both is currently an open line of research. A promising countermeasure with considerable implementation overhead appears to be a mix of first-order secure Threshold Implementations and linear Error-Correcting Codes.

In this paper we employ for the first time the inherent structure of non-systematic codes as fault countermeasure which dynamically mutates the applied generator matrices to achieve a higher-order side-channel and fault-protected design. As a case study, we apply our scheme to the PRESENT block cipher that do not show any higher-order side-channel leakage after measuring 150 million power traces.

Category / Keywords: implementation / FIA, SCA, combined countermeasure, hiding, reconfiguration

Original Publication (in the same form): The 31st IEEE International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors

Date: received 18 Jun 2020

Contact author: jan richter-brockmann at rub de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200618:155223 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/742


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