Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/733

A Side-Channel Resistant Implementation of SABER

Michiel Van Beirendonck and Jan-Pieter D'Anvers and Angshuman Karmakar and Josep Balasch and Ingrid Verbauwhede

Abstract: The candidates for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization have undergone extensive studies on efficiency and theoretical security, but research on their side-channel security is largely lacking. This remains a considerable obstacle for their real-world deployment, where side-channel security can be a critical requirement. This work describes a side-channel resistant instance of Saber, one of the lattice-based candidates, using masking as a countermeasure. Saber proves to be very efficient to mask due to two specific design choices: power-of-two moduli, and limited noise sampling of learning with rounding. A major challenge in masking lattice-based cryptosystems is the integration of bit-wise operations with arithmetic masking, requiring algorithms to securely convert between masked representations. The described design includes a novel primitive for masked logical shifting on arithmetic shares, as well as adapts an existing masked binomial sampler for Saber. An implementation is provided for an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller, and its side-channel resistance is experimentally demonstrated. The masked implementation features a 2.5x overhead factor, significantly lower than the 5.7x previously reported for a masked variant of NewHope. Masked key decapsulation requires less than 3,000,000 cycles on the Cortex-M4 and consumes less than 12kB of dynamic memory, making it suitable for deployment in embedded platforms.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Post-Quantum Cryptography, Masking, SABER, ARM Cortex-M4

Date: received 17 Jun 2020

Contact author: michiel vanbeirendonck at esat kuleuven be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200617:155315 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/733


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