Paper 2020/729
Private Set Intersection in the Internet Setting From Lightweight Oblivious PRF
Melissa Chase and Peihan Miao
Abstract
We present a new protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) with semi-honest security in the plain model and one-sided malicious security in the random oracle model. Our protocol achieves a better balance between computation and communication than existing PSI protocols. Specifically, our protocol is the fastest in networks with moderate bandwidth (e.g., 30 - 100 Mbps). Considering the monetary cost (proposed by Pinkas et al. in CRYPTO 2019) to run the protocol on a cloud computing service, our protocol also compares favorably. Underlying our PSI protocol is a new lightweight multi-point oblivious pesudorandom function (OPRF) protocol based on oblivious transfer (OT) extension. We believe this new protocol may be of independent interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2020
- Keywords
- Private Set IntersectionOblivious Pseudorandom FunctionOT ExtensionSecure Computation
- Contact author(s)
-
melissac @ microsoft com
peihan @ berkeley edu - History
- 2020-08-11: last of 2 revisions
- 2020-06-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/729
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/729,
author = {Melissa Chase and Peihan Miao},
title = {Private Set Intersection in the Internet Setting From Lightweight Oblivious {PRF}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/729},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/729}
}
