Paper 2020/725
Non-Malleable Secret Sharing against Bounded Joint-Tampering Attacks in the Plain Model
Gianluca Brian, Antonio Faonio, Maciej Obremski, Mark Simkin, and Daniele Venturi
Abstract
Secret sharing enables a dealer to split a secret into a set of shares, in such a way that certain authorized subsets of share holders can reconstruct the secret, whereas all unauthorized subsets cannot.
Non-malleable secret sharing (Goyal and Kumar, STOC 2018) additionally requires that, even if the shares have been tampered with, the reconstructed secret is either the original or a completely unrelated one.
In this work, we construct non-malleable secret sharing tolerating
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2020
- Keywords
- secret sharingnon-malleabilityjoint tampering
- Contact author(s)
- brian @ di uniroma1 it
- History
- 2020-06-21: last of 2 revisions
- 2020-06-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/725
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/725, author = {Gianluca Brian and Antonio Faonio and Maciej Obremski and Mark Simkin and Daniele Venturi}, title = {Non-Malleable Secret Sharing against Bounded Joint-Tampering Attacks in the Plain Model}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/725}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/725} }