Paper 2020/716
Signal Injection Attack on Time-to-Digital Converter and Its Application to Physically Unclonable Function
Takeshi Sugawara, Tatsuya Onuma, and Yang Li
Abstract
Physically unclonable function (PUF) is a technology to generate a device-unique identifier using process variation. PUF enables a cryptographic key that appears only when the chip is active, providing an efficient countermeasure against reverse-engineering attacks. In this paper, we explore the data conversion that digitizes a physical quantity representing PUF’s uniqueness into a numerical value as a new attack surface. We focus on time-to-digital converter (TDC) that converts time duration into a numerical value. We show the first signal injection attack on a TDC by manipulating its clock, and verify it through experiments on an off-the-shelf TDC chip. Then, we show how to leverage the attack to reveal a secret key protected by a PUF that uses a TDC for digitization.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. IWSEC2020 (The 15th International Workshop on Security)
- Keywords
- Time-to-Digital ConverterPhysically Unclonable FunctionFault Injection AttackSignal Injection Attack
- Contact author(s)
- sugawara @ uec ac jp
- History
- 2020-06-16: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/716
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/716,
author = {Takeshi Sugawara and Tatsuya Onuma and Yang Li},
title = {Signal Injection Attack on Time-to-Digital Converter and Its Application to Physically Unclonable Function},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/716},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/716}
}
