Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/711

Crowd Verifiable Zero-Knowledge and End-to-end Verifiable Multiparty Computation

Foteini Baldimtsi and Aggelos Kiayias and Thomas Zacharias and Bingsheng Zhang

Abstract: Auditing a secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol entails the validation of the protocol transcript by a third party that is otherwise untrusted. In this work we introduce the concept of end-to-end verifiable MPC (VMPC), that requires the validation to provide a correctness guarantee even in the setting that all servers, trusted setup primitives and all the client systems utilized by the input-providing users of the MPC protocol are subverted by an adversary. To instantiate VMPC, we introduce a new concept in the setting of zero-knowlegde protocols that we term crowd verifiable zero-knowledge (CVZK). A CVZK protocol enables a prover to convince a set of verifiers about a certain statement, even though each one individually contributes a small amount of entropy for verification and some of them are adversarially controlled. Given CVZK, we present a VMPC protocol that is based on discrete-logarithm related assumptions. At the high level of adversity that VMPC is meant to withstand, it is infeasible to ensure perfect correctness, thus we investigate the classes of functions and verifiability relations that are feasible in our framework, and present a number of possible applications the underlying functions of which can be implemented via VMPC.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / multi-party computation, zero-knowledge, privacy, verifiability

Date: received 13 Jun 2020

Contact author: foteini at gmu edu,akiayias@inf ed ac uk,tzachari@inf ed ac uk,bingsheng@zju edu cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200614:202045 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/711


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