Paper 2020/681
An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches
Vittorio Zaccaria
Abstract
This report deals with the problem of identifying the potential correlations between the observable power consumption of a digital circuit and its inputs, when the operating conditions of the circuit involve a logic hazard (also known as glitch). This problem is of utmost importance when the circuit is a cryptographic primitive that must ensure that secret input data (e.g., keys) does not leak. We present a universal algebra construction that allows to derive a set of artefacts from a digital circuit among which a conservative estimate of the Boolean expression that the circuit might leak as well as the extended input/output correlation matrix [1]. This allows the evaluation of the robustness against side channel attacks through a set of constructions that fall under the umbrella of robust probing security [2]. We believe that such a formalisation is well suited for CAD synthesis tools to help the design of more robust cryptographic primitives.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- glitchesstrong non-interferencealgebras
- Contact author(s)
- vittorio zaccaria @ polimi it
- History
- 2020-06-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/681
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/681, author = {Vittorio Zaccaria}, title = {An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/681}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/681} }