Paper 2020/681

An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches

Vittorio Zaccaria


This report deals with the problem of identifying the potential correlations between the observable power consumption of a digital circuit and its inputs, when the operating conditions of the circuit involve a logic hazard (also known as glitch). This problem is of utmost importance when the circuit is a cryptographic primitive that must ensure that secret input data (e.g., keys) does not leak. We present a universal algebra construction that allows to derive a set of artefacts from a digital circuit among which a conservative estimate of the Boolean expression that the circuit might leak as well as the extended input/output correlation matrix [1]. This allows the evaluation of the robustness against side channel attacks through a set of constructions that fall under the umbrella of robust probing security [2]. We believe that such a formalisation is well suited for CAD synthesis tools to help the design of more robust cryptographic primitives.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
glitchesstrong non-interferencealgebras
Contact author(s)
vittorio zaccaria @ polimi it
2020-06-09: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Vittorio Zaccaria},
      title = {An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/681},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, does not use cookies or embedded third party content.