Paper 2020/681

An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches

Vittorio Zaccaria

Abstract

This report deals with the problem of identifying the potential correlations between the observable power consumption of a digital circuit and its inputs, when the operating conditions of the circuit involve a logic hazard (also known as glitch). This problem is of utmost importance when the circuit is a cryptographic primitive that must ensure that secret input data (e.g., keys) does not leak. We present a universal algebra construction that allows to derive a set of artefacts from a digital circuit among which a conservative estimate of the Boolean expression that the circuit might leak as well as the extended input/output correlation matrix [1]. This allows the evaluation of the robustness against side channel attacks through a set of constructions that fall under the umbrella of robust probing security [2]. We believe that such a formalisation is well suited for CAD synthesis tools to help the design of more robust cryptographic primitives.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
glitchesstrong non-interferencealgebras
Contact author(s)
vittorio zaccaria @ polimi it
History
2020-06-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/681
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/681,
      author = {Vittorio Zaccaria},
      title = {An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/681},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/681}
}
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