Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/681

An F-algebra for analysing information leaks in the presence of glitches

Vittorio Zaccaria

Abstract: This report deals with the problem of identifying the potential correlations between the observable power consumption of a digital circuit and its inputs, when the operating conditions of the circuit involve a logic hazard (also known as glitch). This problem is of utmost importance when the circuit is a cryptographic primitive that must ensure that secret input data (e.g., keys) does not leak. We present a universal algebra construction that allows to derive a set of artefacts from a digital circuit among which a conservative estimate of the Boolean expression that the circuit might leak as well as the extended input/output correlation matrix [1]. This allows the evaluation of the robustness against side channel attacks through a set of constructions that fall under the umbrella of robust probing security [2]. We believe that such a formalisation is well suited for CAD synthesis tools to help the design of more robust cryptographic primitives.

Category / Keywords: foundations / glitches, strong non-interference, algebras

Date: received 8 Jun 2020

Contact author: vittorio zaccaria at polimi it

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200609:021926 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/681


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