Paper 2020/676
An airdrop that preserves recipient privacy
Riad S. Wahby, Dan Boneh, Christopher Jeffrey, and Joseph Poon
Abstract
A common approach to bootstrapping a new cryptocurrency is an airdrop, an arrangement in which existing users give away currency to entice new users to join. But current airdrops offer no recipient privacy: they leak which recipients have claimed the funds, and this information is easily linked to off-chain identities. In this work, we address this issue by defining a private airdrop and describing concrete schemes for widely-used user credentials, such as those based on ECDSA and RSA. Our private airdrop for RSA builds upon a new zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of the factorization of a committed secret integer, which may be of independent interest. We also design a private genesis airdrop that efficiently sends private airdrops to millions of users at once. Finally, we implement and evaluate. Our fastest implementation takes 40--180 ms to generate and 3.7--10 ms to verify an RSA private airdrop signature. Signatures are 1.8--3.3 kiB depending on the security parameter.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. FC20
- Keywords
- cryptocurrencyairdropuser privacyzero knowledgeproof of knowledge of factorization
- Contact author(s)
- rsw @ cs stanford edu
- History
- 2020-06-08: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/676
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/676, author = {Riad S. Wahby and Dan Boneh and Christopher Jeffrey and Joseph Poon}, title = {An airdrop that preserves recipient privacy}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/676}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/676} }