Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/671

Persistent Fault Analysis With Few Encryptions

Sebastien Carre and Sylvain Guilley and Olivier Rioul

Abstract: Persistent fault analysis (PFA) consists in guessing block cipher secret keys by biasing their substitution box. This paper improves the original attack of Zhang et al. on AES-128 presented at CHES 2018. By a thorough analysis, the exact probability distribution of the ciphertext (under a uniformly distributed plaintext) is derived, and the maximum likelihood key recovery estimator is computed exactly. Its expression is turned into an attack algorithm, which is shown to be twice more efficient in terms of number of required encryptions than the original attack of Zhang et al. This algorithm is also optimized from a computational complexity standpoint. In addition, our optimal attack is naturally amenable to key enumeration, which expedites full 16- bytes key extraction. Various tradeoffs between data and computational complexities are investigated.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PFA, fault attack, AES

Original Publication (with minor differences): COSADE 2020

Date: received 4 Jun 2020, last revised 11 Jun 2020

Contact author: sebastien carre at secure-ic com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200611:163849 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/671


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