Paper 2020/671
Persistent Fault Analysis With Few Encryptions
Sebastien Carre, Sylvain Guilley, and Olivier Rioul
Abstract
Persistent fault analysis (PFA) consists in guessing block cipher secret keys by biasing their substitution box. This paper improves the original attack of Zhang et al. on AES-128 presented at CHES 2018. By a thorough analysis, the exact probability distribution of the ciphertext (under a uniformly distributed plaintext) is derived, and the maximum likelihood key recovery estimator is computed exactly. Its expression is turned into an attack algorithm, which is shown to be twice more efficient in terms of number of required encryptions than the original attack of Zhang et al. This algorithm is also optimized from a computational complexity standpoint. In addition, our optimal attack is naturally amenable to key enumeration, which expedites full 16- bytes key extraction. Various tradeoffs between data and computational complexities are investigated.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. COSADE 2020
- Keywords
- PFAfault attackAES
- Contact author(s)
- sebastien carre @ secure-ic com
- History
- 2020-06-11: last of 2 revisions
- 2020-06-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/671
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/671,
author = {Sebastien Carre and Sylvain Guilley and Olivier Rioul},
title = {Persistent Fault Analysis With Few Encryptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/671},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/671}
}
