Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/634

SILVER - Statistical Independence and Leakage Verification

David Knichel and Pascal Sasdrich and Amir Moradi

Abstract: Implementing cryptographic functions securely in the presence of physical adversaries is still a challenge although a lion's share of research in the physical security domain has been put in development of countermeasures. Among several protection schemes, masking has absorbed the most attention of research in both academic and industrial communities, due to its theoretical foundation allowing to provide proofs or model the achieved security level. In return, masking schemes are difficult to implement as the implementation process often is manual, complex, and error-prone. This motivated the need for formal verification tools that allow the designers and engineers to analyze and verify the designs before manufacturing.

In this work, we present a new framework to analyze and verify masked implementations against various security notions using different security models as reference. In particular, our framework - which directly processes the resulting gate-level netlist of a hardware synthesis - particularly relies on Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (ROBDDs) and the concept of statistical independence of probability distributions. Compared to existing tools, our framework captivates due to its simplicity, accuracy, and functionality while still having a reasonable efficiency for many applications and common use-cases.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Verification, Side-Channel Analysis, Probing Security, Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagram, Statistical Independence, Probability Distribution

Date: received 28 May 2020, last revised 29 Jun 2020

Contact author: david knichel at rub de,pascal sasdrich@rub de,amir moradi@rub de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Source code: https://github.com/Chair-for-Security-Engineering/SILVER

Version: 20200629:134004 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/634


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