Paper 2020/619

Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG

Viet Tung Hoang and Yaobin Shen

Abstract

We study the security of CTR-DRBG, one of NIST's recommended Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) designs. Recently, Woodage and Shumow (Eurocrypt' 19), and then Cohney et al. (S&P' 20) point out some potential vulnerabilities in both NIST specification and common implementations of CTR-DRBG. While these researchers do suggest counter-measures, the security of the patched CTR-DRBG is still questionable. Our work fills this gap, proving that CTR-DRBG satisfies the robustness notion of Dodis et al. (CCS'13), the standard security goal for PRNGs.

Note: This is the full version of our paper.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2020
Keywords
provable securityPRNGs with inputNIST standard
Contact author(s)
tvhoang @ cs fsu edu
History
2020-08-22: revised
2020-05-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/619
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/619,
      author = {Viet Tung Hoang and Yaobin Shen},
      title = {Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/619},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/619}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/619}
}
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