Paper 2020/619
Security Analysis of NIST CTR-DRBG
Viet Tung Hoang and Yaobin Shen
Abstract
We study the security of CTR-DRBG, one of NIST's recommended Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) designs. Recently, Woodage and Shumow (Eurocrypt' 19), and then Cohney et al. (S&P' 20) point out some potential vulnerabilities in both NIST specification and common implementations of CTR-DRBG. While these researchers do suggest counter-measures, the security of the patched CTR-DRBG is still questionable. Our work fills this gap, proving that CTR-DRBG satisfies the robustness notion of Dodis et al. (CCS'13), the standard security goal for PRNGs.
Note: This is the full version of our paper.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2020
- Keywords
- provable securityPRNGs with inputNIST standard
- Contact author(s)
- tvhoang @ cs fsu edu
- History
- 2020-08-22: revised
- 2020-05-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/619
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/619,
author = {Viet Tung Hoang and Yaobin Shen},
title = {Security Analysis of {NIST} {CTR}-{DRBG}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/619},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/619}
}
