Higher Order Differential Attack against Full-Round BIG

Naoki Shibayama; Yasutaka Igarashi; Toshinobu Kaneko

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Paper 2020/551

Higher Order Differential Attack against Full-Round BIG

Naoki Shibayama, Yasutaka Igarashi, and Toshinobu Kaneko

Abstract

BIG is a 128-bit block cipher proposed by Demeri et al. in 2019. The number of rounds is 18 for high security. The designer evaluated its security against linear cryptanalysis. On the other hand, it has not been reported the security of BIG against higher order differential attack, which is one of the algebraic attacks. In this paper, we focused on a higher order differential of BIG. We found a new 15-round saturation characteristc of BIG using 1-st order differential by computer experiment. Exploiting this characteristic, we show that full-round BIG can be attacked with 6 chosen plaintexts and 2^(2.7) encryption operations.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: cryptanalysis higher order differential attack block cipher BIG
Contact author(s): shiba @ wit ocn ne jp
History: 2020-05-15: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2020/551
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/551,
      author = {Naoki Shibayama and Yasutaka Igarashi and Toshinobu Kaneko},
      title = {Higher Order Differential Attack against Full-Round BIG},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/551},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/551}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/551}
}