Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/464

Can a Blockchain Keep a Secret?

Fabrice Benhamouda and Craig Gentry and Sergey Gorbunov and Shai Halevi and Hugo Krawczyk and Chengyu Lin and Tal Rabin and Leonid Reyzin

Abstract: Blockchains are gaining traction and acceptance, not just for cryptocurrencies but increasingly as a general-purpose architecture for distributed computing. In this work we seek solutions that allow a blockchain to act as a trusted long-term repository of secret information: Our goal is to deposit a secret with the blockchain and specify how to use it (e.g., the conditions under which it is released), and have the blockchain keep this information secret and use it only in the requested manner (e.g., only release it once the conditions are met). This simple functionality would be an enabler for many powerful applications, including signing statements on behalf of the blockchain, using blockchain as the control plane for a storage system, performing decentralized program-obfuscation-as-a-service, and many more.

We present a scalable solution for implementing this functionality on a public proof-of-stake blockchain, in the presence of a mobile adversary controlling a small minority of the stake, using proactive secret sharing techniques. The main challenge is that, on the one hand, scalability requires that we use small committees to represent the entire stake, but, on the other hand, a mobile adversary may be able to corrupt the entire committee if it is small. For this reason, prior proactive secret sharing solutions are either non-scalable or insecure in our setting.

We solve this issue using "player replaceability", where the committee is anonymous until after it performs its actions, as in the Algorand blockchain. (Algorand uses player replaceability to defend against DDoS attacks.) Our main technical contribution is a system that allows sharing and re-sharing of secrets among the members of small dynamic committees, without knowing who they are until after they perform their actions. Our solution handles a fully mobile adversary corrupting less than 25% of the stake at any time, and is scalable in terms of both the number of parties on the blockchain and the number of time intervals.

Category / Keywords: applications / Blockchain, Mobile Adversary, Player Replacability, Proactive Secret Sharing

Date: received 21 Apr 2020, last revised 24 Apr 2020

Contact author: shaih at alum mit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200424:141036 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/464


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]