Paper 2020/455
Cryptanalysis of LEDAcrypt
Daniel Apon, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, and Paolo Santini
Abstract
We report on the concrete cryptanalysis of LEDAcrypt, a 2nd Round candidate in NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process and one of 17 encryption schemes that remain as candidates for near-term standardization. LEDAcrypt consists of a public-key encryption scheme built from the McEliece paradigm and a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) built from the Niederreiter paradigm, both using a quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) code.
In this work, we identify a large class of extremely weak keys and provide an algorithm to recover them. For example, we demonstrate how to recover 1 in
Note: Fixed a few typos
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- NIST PQCLEDAcryptMcElieceQC-LDPCCryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
-
daniel apon @ nist gov
ray perlner @ nist gov
angela robinson @ nist gov
p santini @ pm univpm it - History
- 2020-04-20: last of 2 revisions
- 2020-04-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/455
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/455, author = {Daniel Apon and Ray Perlner and Angela Robinson and Paolo Santini}, title = {Cryptanalysis of {LEDAcrypt}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/455}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/455} }