Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/400

Threshold Implementations Are Not Provably Secure Against Fault Sensitivity Analysis

Jeroen Delvaux

Abstract: In an article presented at FDTC 2018, Arribas, De Cnudde, and Sijacic prove under mild conditions that threshold implementations (TIs) are secure against fault sensitivity analysis (FSA). Later in 2018, in the PhD thesis of De Cnudde, additional assumptions were imposed to provably withstand FSA, thereby increasing the required number of random bits. We point out that even under the latter, stronger conditions, the proof is incorrect.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Threshold Implementations, Fault Sensitivity Analysis

Date: received 9 Apr 2020, last revised 11 Aug 2020

Contact author: jeroen delvaux at osr-tech com

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Version: 20200811:122058 (All versions of this report)

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