Paper 2020/400
Threshold Implementations Are Not Provably Secure Against Fault Sensitivity Analysis
Jeroen Delvaux
Abstract
In an article presented at FDTC 2018, Arribas, De Cnudde, and Sijacic prove under mild conditions that threshold implementations (TIs) are secure against fault sensitivity analysis (FSA). Later in 2018, in the PhD thesis of De Cnudde, additional assumptions were imposed to provably withstand FSA, thereby increasing the required number of random bits. We point out that even under the latter, stronger conditions, the proof is incorrect.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Threshold ImplementationsFault Sensitivity Analysis
- Contact author(s)
- jeroen delvaux @ osr-tech com
- History
- 2020-11-06: last of 5 revisions
- 2020-04-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/400
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/400,
author = {Jeroen Delvaux},
title = {Threshold Implementations Are Not Provably Secure Against Fault Sensitivity Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/400},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/400}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/400}
}
