Paper 2020/399

Analysis of DP3T

Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

To help fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project proposed a Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP3T) system. This helps tracking the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus while keeping the privacy of individuals safe. In this report, we analyze the security and the privacy protection of DP3T. Without questioning how effective it could be against the pandemic, we show that it may introduce severe risks to society. Furthermore, we argue that some privacy protection measurements by DP3T may have the opposite affect of what they were intended to. Specifically, sick and reported people may be deanonymized, private encounters may be revealed, and people may be coerced to reveal the private data they collect.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
COVID-19trackingsecurityprivacy
Contact author(s)
serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
History
2020-04-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/399
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/399,
      author = {Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {Analysis of DP3T},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/399},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399}
}
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