Paper 2020/399
Analysis of DP3T
Serge Vaudenay
Abstract
To help fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project proposed a Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP3T) system. This helps tracking the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus while keeping the privacy of individuals safe. In this report, we analyze the security and the privacy protection of DP3T. Without questioning how effective it could be against the pandemic, we show that it may introduce severe risks to society. Furthermore, we argue that some privacy protection measurements by DP3T may have the opposite affect of what they were intended to. Specifically, sick and reported people may be deanonymized, private encounters may be revealed, and people may be coerced to reveal the private data they collect.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- COVID-19trackingsecurityprivacy
- Contact author(s)
- serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
- History
- 2020-04-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/399
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/399,
author = {Serge Vaudenay},
title = {Analysis of {DP3T}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/399},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399}
}
