Paper 2020/386

Accountability in a Permissioned Blockchain: Formal Analysis of Hyperledger Fabric

Ralf Kuesters, Daniel Rausch, and Mike Simon

Abstract

While accountability is a well-known concept in distributed systems and cryptography, in the literature on blockchains (and, more generally, distributed ledgers) the formal treatment of accountability has been a blind spot: there does not exist a formalization let alone a formal proof of accountability for any blockchain yet. Therefore, in this work we put forward and propose a formal treatment of accountability in this domain. Our goal is to formally state and prove that if in a run of a blockchain a central security property, such as consistency, is not satisfied, then misbehaving parties can be identified and held accountable. Accountability is particularly useful for permissioned blockchains where all parties know each other, and hence, accountability incentivizes all parties to behave honestly. We exemplify our approach for one of the most prominent permissioned blockchains: Hyperledger Fabric in its most common instantiation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.EuroS&P 2020
Keywords
accountabilityblockchainsdistributed ledgersdistributed systemsHyperledger Fabric
Contact author(s)
ralf kuesters @ sec uni-stuttgart de
History
2020-04-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/386
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/386,
      author = {Ralf Kuesters and Daniel Rausch and Mike Simon},
      title = {Accountability in a Permissioned Blockchain: Formal Analysis of Hyperledger Fabric},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/386},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/386}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/386}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.