Quasigroups and Substitution Permutation Networks: A Failed Experiment

George Teseleanu

Abstract

We introduce a generalization of substitution permutation networks using quasigroups. Then, we prove that for quasigroups isotopic with a group $\mathbb{G}$, the complexity of mounting a differential attack against our generalization is the same as attacking a substitution permutation network based on $\mathbb{G}$. Although the result is negative, we believe that the design can be instructional for teaching students that failure is a natural part of research. Also, we hope to prevent others from making the same mistake by showing where such a path leads.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Cryptologia
Keywords
quasigroupssubstitution permutation networksteaching
Contact author(s)
george teseleanu @ yahoo com
History
2022-03-15: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/357

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/357,
author = {George Teseleanu},
title = {Quasigroups and Substitution Permutation Networks: A Failed Experiment},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/357},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/357}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/357}
}

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