Paper 2020/324
Defeating CAS-Unlock
Bicky Shakya, Xiaolin Xu, Mark Tehranipoor, and Domenic Forte
Abstract
Recently, a logic locking approach termed `CAS-Lock' was proposed to simultaneously counter Boolean satisfiability (SAT) and bypass attacks. The technique modifies the AND/OR tree structure in Anti-SAT to achieve non-trivial output corruptibility while maintaining resistance to both SAT and bypass attacks. An attack against CAS-Lock (dubbed `CAS-Unlock') was also recently proposed on a naive implementation of CAS-Lock. It relies on setting key values to all 1's or 0's to break CAS-Lock. In this short paper, we evaluate this attack's ineffectiveness and describe a misinterpretation of CAS-Lock's implementation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Logic LockingCombinational Locking
- Contact author(s)
-
bshakya @ ufl edu
xiaolin8 @ uic edu
tehranipoor @ ece ufl edu
dforte @ ece ufl edu - History
- 2020-03-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/324
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/324,
author = {Bicky Shakya and Xiaolin Xu and Mark Tehranipoor and Domenic Forte},
title = {Defeating CAS-Unlock},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/324},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/324}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/324}
}
