Paper 2020/324

Defeating CAS-Unlock

Bicky Shakya, Xiaolin Xu, Mark Tehranipoor, and Domenic Forte

Abstract

Recently, a logic locking approach termed `CAS-Lock' was proposed to simultaneously counter Boolean satisfiability (SAT) and bypass attacks. The technique modifies the AND/OR tree structure in Anti-SAT to achieve non-trivial output corruptibility while maintaining resistance to both SAT and bypass attacks. An attack against CAS-Lock (dubbed `CAS-Unlock') was also recently proposed on a naive implementation of CAS-Lock. It relies on setting key values to all 1's or 0's to break CAS-Lock. In this short paper, we evaluate this attack's ineffectiveness and describe a misinterpretation of CAS-Lock's implementation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Logic LockingCombinational Locking
Contact author(s)
bshakya @ ufl edu
xiaolin8 @ uic edu
tehranipoor @ ece ufl edu
dforte @ ece ufl edu
History
2020-03-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/324
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/324,
      author = {Bicky Shakya and Xiaolin Xu and Mark Tehranipoor and Domenic Forte},
      title = {Defeating {CAS}-Unlock},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/324},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/324}
}
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