Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/280

Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption from Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions

Juliane Krämer and Patrick Struck

Abstract: In this work we study the leakage resilience of authenticated encryption schemes. We show that, if one settles for non-adaptive leakage, leakage-resilient authenticated encryption schemes can be built solely from leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions. Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT 2019) introduce the FGHF' construction which allows to build leakage-resilient authenticated encryption schemes from functions which, under leakage, retain both pseudorandomness and unpredictability. We revisit their construction and show the following. First, pseudorandomness and unpredictability do not imply one another in the leakage setting. Unfortunately, this entails that any instantiation of the FGHF' construction indeed seems to require a function that is proven both pseudorandom and unpredictable under leakage. Second, however, we show that the unpredictability requirement is an artefact that stems from the underlying composition theorem of the N2 construction given by Barwell et al. (ASIACRYPT 2017). By recasting this composition theorem, we show that the unpredictability requirement is unnecessary for the FGHF' construction. Thus, leakage-resilient AEAD schemes can be obtained by instantiating the FGHF' construction with functions that are solely pseudorandom under leakage.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / AEAD, Leakage Resilience, Side Channels, FGHF'

Original Publication (with minor differences): 11th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2020)

Date: received 3 Mar 2020, last revised 17 Jul 2020

Contact author: patrick at qpc tu-darmstadt de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200717:125230 (All versions of this report)

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