Paper 2020/267
Differential Power Analysis of the Picnic Signature Scheme
Tim Gellersen, Okan Seker, and Thomas Eisenbarth
Abstract
This work introduces the first differential side-channel analysis of the Picnic Signature Scheme, an alternate candidate in the ongoing competition for post-quantum cryptography by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We present a successful side-channel analysis of the underlying multiparty implementation of the LowMC block cipher (MPC-LowMC) and show how side-channel information can be used to recover the entire secret key by exploiting two different parts of the algorithm. LowMC key recovery then allows to forge signatures for the calling Picnic post-quantum signature scheme. We target the NIST reference implementation executed on a FRDM-K66F development board. Key recovery succeeds with fewer than 1000 LowMC traces, which can be obtained from fewer than 30 observed Picnic signatures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PQCrypto 2021
- Keywords
- Picnic Signature SchemeLowMcMultiparty ComputationPower AnalysisDPA
- Contact author(s)
-
tim gellersen @ student uni-luebeck de
okan seker @ uni-luebeck de
thomas eisenbarth @ uni-luebeck de - History
- 2021-05-18: revised
- 2020-03-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/267
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/267,
author = {Tim Gellersen and Okan Seker and Thomas Eisenbarth},
title = {Differential Power Analysis of the Picnic Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/267},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/267}
}
