Paper 2020/195
Replicated state machines without replicated execution
Jonathan Lee, Kirill Nikitin, and Srinath Setty
Abstract
This paper introduces a new approach to reduce end-to-end costs in large-scale
replicated systems built under a Byzantine fault model. Specifically, our
approach transforms a given replicated state machine (RSM) to another RSM where
nodes incur lower costs by delegating state machine execution: an untrusted
prover produces succinct cryptographic proofs of correct state transitions
along with state changes, which nodes in the transformed RSM verify and apply
respectively.
To realize our approach, we build Piperine, a system that makes the proof
machinery profitable in the context of RSMs. Specifically, Piperine reduces the
costs of both proving and verifying the correctness of state machine execution
while retaining liveness—a distinctive requirement in the context of RSMs. Our
experimental evaluation demonstrates that, for a payment service, employing
Piperine is more pro table than naive reexecution of transactions as long as
there are
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 2020
- Keywords
- verifiable computingzkSNARKsblockchainreplicated state machines
- Contact author(s)
- srinath @ microsoft com
- History
- 2020-02-18: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/195
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/195, author = {Jonathan Lee and Kirill Nikitin and Srinath Setty}, title = {Replicated state machines without replicated execution}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/195}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/195} }