Paper 2020/1616

Algebraic Geometric Secret Sharing Schemes over Large Fields Are Asymptotically Threshold

Fan Peng, Hao Chen, and Chang-An Zhao

Abstract

In Chen-Cramer Crypto 2006 paper \cite{cc} algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes were proposed such that the ``Fundamental Theorem in Information-Theoretically Secure Multiparty Computation" by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson \cite{BGW88} and Chaum, Crépeau and Damgård \cite{CCD88} can be established over constant-size base finite fields. These algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes defined by a curve of genus g over a constant size finite field Fq is quasi-threshold in the following sense, any subset of uT1 players (non qualified) has no information of the secret and any subset of uT+2g players (qualified) can reconstruct the secret. It is natural to ask that how far from the threshold these quasi-threshold secret sharing schemes are? How many subsets of players can recover the secret or have no information of the secret? In this paper it is proved that almost all subsets of players have no information of the secret and almost all subsets of players can reconstruct the secret when the size goes to the infinity and the genus satisfies . Then algebraic geometric secretsharing schemes over large finite fields are asymptotically threshold in this case. We also analyze the case when the size of the base field is fixed and the genus goes to the infinity.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Algebraic geometric secret sharingQuasi-thresholdThresholdAlgebraic-Geometry codes.
Contact author(s)
zhaochan3 @ mail sysu edu cn
History
2020-12-30: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1616
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1616,
      author = {Fan Peng and Hao Chen and Chang-An Zhao},
      title = {Algebraic Geometric Secret Sharing Schemes over Large Fields Are Asymptotically Threshold},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1616},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1616}
}
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