Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1581

Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice

Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim

Abstract: Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / homomorphic encryption, approximate encryption, passive security

Date: received 18 Dec 2020, last revised 21 Dec 2020

Contact author: jhcheon at snu ac kr,swanhong@snu ac kr,doodoo1204@snu ac kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201221:082719 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1581