Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice

Jung Hee Cheon; Seungwan Hong; Duhyeong Kim

Paper 2020/1581

Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice

Jung Hee Cheon, Seungwan Hong, and Duhyeong Kim

Abstract

Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: homomorphic encryption approximate encryption passive security
Contact author(s): jhcheon @ snu ac kr
swanhong @ snu ac kr
doodoo1204 @ snu ac kr
History: 2020-12-21: revised; 2020-12-21: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2020/1581
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1581,
      author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim},
      title = {Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1581},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}
}