Paper 2020/1581

Remark on the Security of CKKS Scheme in Practice

Jung Hee Cheon, Seungwan Hong, and Duhyeong Kim

Abstract

Recently, Li and Micciancio (ePrint 2020/1533) have proposed a passive attack on the CKKS approximate homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme, which allows an adversary to query decryption on valid ciphertexts. In this paper, we discuss for which applications such attack is applicable, and introduce an extension of the HEaaN library. In addition, we investigate the mitigation strategies of other HE libraries that support the CKKS scheme including HElib, PALISADE, Lattigo and SEAL.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
homomorphic encryptionapproximate encryptionpassive security
Contact author(s)
jhcheon @ snu ac kr
swanhong @ snu ac kr
doodoo1204 @ snu ac kr
History
2020-12-21: revised
2020-12-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1581
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1581,
      author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Seungwan Hong and Duhyeong Kim},
      title = {Remark on the Security of {CKKS} Scheme in Practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1581},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1581}
}
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