Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1560

Modified Cache Template Attack on AES

Mahdi Esfahani and Hadi Soleimany and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract: CPU caches are a powerful source of information leakage. To develop practical cache-based attacks, there is an increasingly need to automate the process of finding exploitable cache-based side-channels in computer systems. Cache template attack is a generic technique that utilizes Flush+Reload attack in order to automatically exploit cache vulnerability of Intel platforms. Cache template attack on T-table-based AES implementation consists of two phases including the profiling phase and the key exploitation phase. Profiling is a preprocessing phase to monitor dependencies between the secret key and behavior of the cache memory. In addition, the addresses of T-tables can be obtained automatically. In the key exploitation phase, most significant bits (MSBs) of the secret key bytes are retrieved by monitoring exploitable addresses. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective searching technique which accelerates the profiling phase by a factor of at most 64. To verify the theoretical model of our technique, we implement the described attack on AES. The experimental results showed the profiling phase runtime of the cache template attack is around 10 minutes while our method speeds up the running of this phase to around 9 seconds.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Flush+Reload attack, inclusive memory, AES, cache template attacks, automation

Original Publication (in the same form): SCIENTIA IRANICA

Date: received 14 Dec 2020

Contact author: hadi soleimany at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201217:094002 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1560


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]