Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1556

Honest Majority MPC with Abort with Minimal Online Communication

Daniel Escudero and Anders Dalskov

Abstract: In this work we focus on improving the communication complexity of the online phase of honest majority MPC protocols. To this end, we present a general and simple method to compile arbitrary secret-sharing-based passively secure protocols defined over an arbitrary ring that are secure up to additive attacks in a malicious setting, to actively secure protocols with abort. The resulting protocol has a total communication complexity in the online phase of $1.5(n-1)$ shares, which amounts to $1.5$ shares per party asymptotically. An important aspect of our techniques is that they can be seen as generalization of ideas that have been used in other works in a rather ad-hoc manner for different secret-sharing protocols. Thus, our work serves as a way of unifying key ideas in recent honest majority protocols, to understand better the core techniques and similarities among these works. Furthermore, for $n=3$, when instantiated with replicated secret-sharing-based protocols (Araki et al. CCS 2016), the communication complexity in the online phase amounts to only $1$ ring element per party, matching the communication complexity of the BLAZE protocol (Patra & Suresh, NDSS 2020), while having a much simpler design.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure multiparty computation, protocol, communication efficient, honest-majority

Date: received 13 Dec 2020

Contact author: escudero at cs au dk, anderspkd@fastmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201213:170836 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1556


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