Paper 2020/1506

Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example

Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger

Abstract

Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this tutorial, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
cryptographic protocolslattice techniques
Contact author(s)
gabrielle de-micheli @ inria fr
nadiah @ cs ucsd edu
History
2020-12-11: last of 3 revisions
2020-12-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1506
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1506,
      author = {Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger},
      title = {Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1506},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506}
}
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