Paper 2020/1506
Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example
Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger
Abstract
Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this tutorial, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- cryptographic protocolslattice techniques
- Contact author(s)
-
gabrielle de-micheli @ inria fr
nadiah @ cs ucsd edu - History
- 2020-12-11: last of 3 revisions
- 2020-12-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1506
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1506,
author = {Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger},
title = {Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1506},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506}
}
