Paper 2020/1463
Observations on the Tightness of the Security Bounds of GIFT-COFB and HyENA
Mustafa Khairallah
Abstract
In this article, we analyze and investigate two authenticated encryption algorithms: GIFT-COFB and HyENA. The two modes differ in some low levels details in both the design and security proofs. However, they share a lot of similarities. We take a look at the best-known attacks and security proofs of these designs. We show that the best-known attack is not a matching attack to the security bounds provided by the designers in the security proof. Second, we give a new attack that we characterize as an {\it "almost matching"} attack. It is significantly closer to the provable security bounds. The new attack requires
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Contact author(s)
- MUSTAFAM001 @ e ntu edu sg
- History
- 2021-05-18: revised
- 2020-11-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1463
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1463, author = {Mustafa Khairallah}, title = {Observations on the Tightness of the Security Bounds of {GIFT}-{COFB} and {HyENA}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1463}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1463} }