Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1455

An Analytic Attack Against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-Channel Leakage

Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald and Srinivas Vivek

Abstract: In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation's seemingly `inherent resilience' against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.

Category / Keywords: implementation / ARX construction, Side-channel analysis, Hamming weight, Chosen plaintext attack

Original Publication (in the same form): ICISSP 2021

Date: received 17 Nov 2020

Contact author: yanyansmajesty at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201119:094517 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1455


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