Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1350

Senate: A Maliciously-Secure MPC Platform for Collaborative Analytics

Rishabh Poddar and Sukrit Kalra and Avishay Yanai and Ryan Deng and Raluca Ada Popa and Joseph M. Hellerstein

Abstract: Many organizations stand to benefit from pooling their data together in order to draw mutually beneficial insights -- e.g., for fraud detection across banks, better medical studies across hospitals, etc. However, such organizations are often prevented from sharing their data with each other by privacy concerns, regulatory hurdles, or business competition.

We present Senate, a system that allows multiple parties to collaboratively run analytical SQL queries without revealing their individual data to each other. Unlike prior works on secure multi-party computation (MPC) that assume that all parties are semi-honest, Senate protects the data even in the presence of malicious adversaries. At the heart of Senate lies a new MPC decomposition protocol that decomposes the cryptographic MPC computation into smaller units, some of which can be executed by subsets of parties and in parallel, while preserving its security guarantees. Senate then provides a new query planning algorithm that decomposes and plans the cryptographic computation effectively, achieving a performance of up to 145$\times$ faster than the state-of-the-art.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure multiparty computation, malicious adversary

Original Publication (in the same form): USENIX Security 2021

Date: received 26 Oct 2020

Contact author: rishabhp at eecs berkeley edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201029:145400 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1350


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