We present Senate, a system that allows multiple parties to collaboratively run analytical SQL queries without revealing their individual data to each other. Unlike prior works on secure multi-party computation (MPC) that assume that all parties are semi-honest, Senate protects the data even in the presence of malicious adversaries. At the heart of Senate lies a new MPC decomposition protocol that decomposes the cryptographic MPC computation into smaller units, some of which can be executed by subsets of parties and in parallel, while preserving its security guarantees. Senate then provides a new query planning algorithm that decomposes and plans the cryptographic computation effectively, achieving a performance of up to 145$\times$ faster than the state-of-the-art.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure multiparty computation, malicious adversary Original Publication (in the same form): USENIX Security 2021 Date: received 26 Oct 2020 Contact author: rishabhp at eecs berkeley edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20201029:145400 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1350