Paper 2020/1267

Fault Attacks In Symmetric Key Cryptosystems

Anubhab Baksi, Shivam Bhasin, Jakub Breier, Dirmanto Jap, and Dhiman Saha

Abstract

Fault attacks are among the well-studied topics in the area of cryptography. These attacks constitute a powerful tool to recover the secret key used in the encryption process. Fault attacks work by forcing a device to work under non-ideal environmental conditions (such as high temperature) or external disturbances (such as glitch in the power supply) while performing a cryptographic operation. The recent trend shows that the amount of research in this direction; which ranges from attacking a particular primitive, proposing a fault countermeasure, to attacking countermeasures; has grown up substantially and going to stay as an active research interest for a foreseeable future. Hence, it becomes apparent to have a comprehensive yet compact study of the (major) works. This work, which covers a wide spectrum in the present day research on fault attacks that fall under the purview of the symmetric key cryptography, aims at fulfilling the absence of an up-to-date survey. We present mostly all aspects of the topic in a way which is not only understandable for a non-expert reader, but also helpful for an expert as a reference.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM Journal of Computing Surveys
Keywords
fault attackcountermeasuresymmetric keysystemization of knowledge
Contact author(s)
anubhab001 @ e ntu edu sg
History
2022-03-25: last of 8 revisions
2020-10-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1267
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1267,
      author = {Anubhab Baksi and Shivam Bhasin and Jakub Breier and Dirmanto Jap and Dhiman Saha},
      title = {Fault Attacks In Symmetric Key Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1267},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1267}
}
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