Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1263

Improved Fault Analysis on SIMECK Ciphers

Duc-Phong Le and Rongxing Lu and Ali A. Ghorbani

Abstract: The advances of the Internet of Things (IoT) have had a fundamental impact and influence in sharping our rich living experiences. However, since IoT devices are usually resource-constrained, lightweight block ciphers have played a major role in serving as a building block for secure IoT protocols. In CHES 2015, SIMECK, a family of block ciphers, was designed for resource-constrained IoT devices. Since its publication, there have been many analyses on its security. In this paper, under the one bit-flip model, we propose a new efficient fault analysis attack on SIMECK ciphers. Compared to those previously reported attacks, our attack can recover the full master key by injecting faults into only a single round of all SIMECK family members. This property is crucial, as it is infeasible for an attacker to inject faults into different rounds of a SIMECK implementation on IoT devices in the real world. Specifically, our attack is characterized by exercising a deep analysis of differential trail between the correct and faulty immediate ciphertexts. Extensive simulation evaluations are conducted, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness and correctness of our proposed attack.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / DFA, Simeck block cipher, cryptanalysis, Lightweight cryptography

Date: received 11 Oct 2020

Contact author: le duc phong at unb ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201014:180546 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1263


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