Paper 2020/1234
Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model
Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa
Abstract
In the random oracle model (ROM), it is provable from the DL assumption, whereas there is negative circumstantial evidence in the standard model. Fleischhacker, Jager, and Schröder showed that the tight security of the Schnorr signature is unprovable from a strong cryptographic assumption, such as the One-More DL (OM-DL) assumption and the computational and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the ROM via a generic reduction as long as the underlying cryptographic assumption holds. However, it remains open whether or not the impossibility of the provable security of the Schnorr signature from a strong assumption via a non-tight and reasonable reduction. In this paper, we show that the security of the Schnorr signature is unprovable from the OM-DL assumption in the non-programmable ROM as long as the OM-DL assumption holds. Our impossibility result is proven via a non-tight Turing reduction.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ProvSec2017
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-68637-0_12
- Keywords
- digital signaturesdiscrete logarithm problem
- Contact author(s)
-
fukumitsu @ do-johodai ac jp
shingo hasegawa b7 @ tohoku ac jp - History
- 2021-06-08: revised
- 2020-10-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1234
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1234,
author = {Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa},
title = {Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more {DL} Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1234},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-68637-0_12},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1234}
}
