Paper 2020/1217

R-Propping of HK17: Upgrade for a Detached Proposal of NIST PQC First Round Survey

Pedro Hecht

Abstract

NIST is currently conducting the 3rd round of a survey to find post-quantum class asymmetric protocols (PQC) [1]. We participated in a joint-team with a fellow researcher of the Interamerican Open University (UAI) with a Key-Exchange Protocol (KEP) called HK17 [2]. The proposal was flawed because Bernstein [3] found a weakness, which was later refined by Li [4] using a quadratic reduction of octonions and quaternions, albeit no objection about the published non-commutative protocol and the one-way trapdoor function (OWTF). This fact promoted the search for a suitable algebraic platform. HK17 had its interest because it was the only first-round offer strictly based on canonical group theory [5]. At last, we adapted the original protocol with the R-propping solution of 3-dimensional tensors [6], yielding Bernstein attack fruitless. Therefore, an El Gamal IND-CCA2 cipher security using Cao [7] arguments are at hand.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Post-quantum cryptographyfinite fieldsringscombinatorial group theoryR-proppingKEPnon-commutative cryptographysemantic securityIND-CCA2
Contact author(s)
qubit101 @ gmail com
History
2020-10-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1217
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1217,
      author = {Pedro Hecht},
      title = {R-Propping of {HK17}: Upgrade for a Detached Proposal of {NIST} {PQC} First Round Survey},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1217},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1217}
}
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