Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1217

R-Propping of HK17: Upgrade for a Detached Proposal of NIST PQC First Round Survey

Pedro Hecht

Abstract: NIST is currently conducting the 3rd round of a survey to find post-quantum class asymmetric protocols (PQC) [1]. We participated in a joint-team with a fellow researcher of the Interamerican Open University (UAI) with a Key-Exchange Protocol (KEP) called HK17 [2]. The proposal was flawed because Bernstein [3] found a weakness, which was later refined by Li [4] using a quadratic reduction of octonions and quaternions, albeit no objection about the published non-commutative protocol and the one-way trapdoor function (OWTF). This fact promoted the search for a suitable algebraic platform. HK17 had its interest because it was the only first-round offer strictly based on canonical group theory [5]. At last, we adapted the original protocol with the R-propping solution of 3-dimensional tensors [6], yielding Bernstein attack fruitless. Therefore, an El Gamal IND-CCA2 cipher security using Cao [7] arguments are at hand.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Post-quantum cryptography, finite fields, rings, combinatorial group theory, R-propping, KEP, non-commutative cryptography, semantic security, IND-CCA2

Date: received 3 Oct 2020, last revised 5 Oct 2020

Contact author: qubit101 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201006:094323 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1217


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