Paper 2020/1217
R-Propping of HK17: Upgrade for a Detached Proposal of NIST PQC First Round Survey
Pedro Hecht
Abstract
NIST is currently conducting the 3rd round of a survey to find post-quantum class asymmetric protocols (PQC) [1]. We participated in a joint-team with a fellow researcher of the Interamerican Open University (UAI) with a Key-Exchange Protocol (KEP) called HK17 [2]. The proposal was flawed because Bernstein [3] found a weakness, which was later refined by Li [4] using a quadratic reduction of octonions and quaternions, albeit no objection about the published non-commutative protocol and the one-way trapdoor function (OWTF). This fact promoted the search for a suitable algebraic platform. HK17 had its interest because it was the only first-round offer strictly based on canonical group theory [5]. At last, we adapted the original protocol with the R-propping solution of 3-dimensional tensors [6], yielding Bernstein attack fruitless. Therefore, an El Gamal IND-CCA2 cipher security using Cao [7] arguments are at hand.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptographyfinite fieldsringscombinatorial group theoryR-proppingKEPnon-commutative cryptographysemantic securityIND-CCA2
- Contact author(s)
- qubit101 @ gmail com
- History
- 2020-10-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1217
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1217,
author = {Pedro Hecht},
title = {R-Propping of HK17: Upgrade for a Detached Proposal of NIST PQC First Round Survey},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1217},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1217}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1217}
}
