Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1193

Bypassing Isolated Execution on RISC-V with Fault Injection

Shoei Nashimoto and Daisuke Suzuki and Rei Ueno and Naofumi Homma

Abstract: RISC-V is equipped with physical memory protection (PMP) to prevent malicious software from accessing protected memory regions. One of the main objectives of PMP is to provide a trusted execution environment (TEE) that isolates secure and insecure applications. In this study, we propose a fault injection attack to bypass the isolation based on PMP. The proposed attack scheme involves extracting successful glitch parameters for fault injection under the assumption of a black-box environment. We implement a proof-of-concept TEE compatible with PMP in RISC-V, and we verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed attack through some experiments conducted in the TEE. The results show that an attacker can bypass the isolation of the TEE and read data from the protected memory region.

Category / Keywords: applications / Fault Injection, RISC-V, Memory Protection, Trusted Execution Environment

Date: received 30 Sep 2020

Contact author: nashimoto shoei at bx mitsubishielectric co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200930:075147 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1193


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