Paper 2020/1171
On the Price of Concurrency in Group Ratcheting Protocols
Alexander Bienstock, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Paul Rösler
Abstract
Post-Compromise Security, or PCS, refers to the ability of a given protocol to recover—by means of normal protocol operations—from the exposure of local states of its (otherwise honest) participants. While PCS in the two-party setting has attracted a lot of attention recently, the problem of achieving PCS in the group setting—called group ratcheting here—is much less understood. On the one hand, one can achieve excellent security by simply executing, in parallel, a two-party ratcheting protocol (e.g., Signal) for each pair of members in a group. However, this incurs
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2020
- Keywords
- Group ratchetinggroup messagingcontinuous group key agreementCGKAcommunication complexityconcurrent updateslower boundupper boundpost-compromise securitysymbolic proof
- Contact author(s)
- paul roesler @ rub de
- History
- 2021-05-19: last of 3 revisions
- 2020-09-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1171
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1171, author = {Alexander Bienstock and Yevgeniy Dodis and Paul Rösler}, title = {On the Price of Concurrency in Group Ratcheting Protocols}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1171}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1171} }