Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1149

Deterministic Wallets in a Quantum World

Nabil Alkeilani Alkadri and Poulami Das and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Juliane Krämer and Siavash Riahi and Patrick Struck

Abstract: Most blockchain solutions are susceptible to quantum attackers as they rely on cryptography that is known to be insecure in the presence of quantum adversaries. In this work we advance the study of quantum-resistant blockchain solutions by giving a quantum-resistant construction of a deterministic wallet scheme. Deterministic wallets are frequently used in practice in order to secure funds by storing the sensitive secret key on a so-called cold wallet that is not connected to the Internet. Recently, Das et al. (CCS'19) developed a formal model for the security analysis of deterministic wallets and proposed a generic construction from certain types of signature schemes that exhibit key rerandomization properties. We revisit the proposed classical construction in the presence of quantum adversaries and obtain the following results.

First, we give a generic wallet construction with security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) if the underlying signature scheme is secure in the QROM. We next design the first post-quantum secure signature scheme with rerandomizable public keys by giving a construction from generic lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signature schemes. Finally, we show and evaluate the practicality by analyzing an instantiation of the wallet scheme based on the signature scheme qTESLA (ACNS'20).

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / blockchain protocols, deterministic wallets, post-quantum, rerandomizable signatures, provable security, lattice-based cryptography

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACM CCS 2020

Date: received 21 Sep 2020

Contact author: nabil alkadri at tu-darmstadt de, poulami das@tu-darmstadt de, andreas erwig@tu-darmstadt de, siavash riahi@tu-darmstadt de, patrick@qpc tu-darmstadt de

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Version: 20200925:183537 (All versions of this report)

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