Paper 2020/1146

Let's Tessellate: Tiling for Security Against Advanced Probe and Fault Adversaries

Siemen Dhooghe and Svetla Nikova

Abstract

The wire probe-and-fault models are currently the most used models to provide arguments for side-channel and fault security. However, several practical attacks are not yet covered by these models. This work extends the wire fault model to include more advanced faults such as area faults and permanent faults. Moreover, we show the tile probe-and-fault adversary model from CRYPTO 2018's CAPA envelops the extended wire fault model along with known extensions to the probing model such as glitches, transitions, and couplings. In other words, tiled (tessellated) designs offer security guarantees even against advanced probe and fault adversaries. As tiled models use multi-party computation techniques, countermeasures are typically expensive for software/hardware. This work investigates a tiled countermeasure based on the ISW methodology which is shown to perform significantly better than CAPA for practical parameters.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
MaskingNon-InterferenceProbing SecuritySIFA
Contact author(s)
siemen dhooghe @ esat kuleuven be
History
2020-09-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1146
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1146,
      author = {Siemen Dhooghe and Svetla Nikova},
      title = {Let's Tessellate: Tiling for Security Against Advanced Probe and Fault Adversaries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1146},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1146}
}
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