Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1121

Post-Quantum Linkable Ring Signature Enabling Distributed Authorised Ring Confidential Transactions in Blockchain

Wilson Alberto Torres and Ron Steinfeld and Amin Sakzad and Veronika Kuchta

Abstract: When electronic wallets are transferred by more than one party, the level of security can be enhanced by decentralising the distribution of authorisation amongst those parties. Threshold signature schemes enable this functionality by allowing multiple cosigners to cooperate in order to create a joint signature. These cosigners interact to sign a transaction which then confirms that a wallet has been transferred. However, in the event of a post-quantum attack, existing threshold signature schemes that support such an authorisation technique in privacy-preserving cryptocurrency protocols - like Ring Confidential Transaction (RingCT) - would not provide adequate security.

In this paper, we present a new post-quantum cryptographic mechanism, called Lattice-based Linkable Ring Signature with Co-Signing (L2RS-CS), which offers a distributed authorisation feature to protect electronic wallets. A novel security model for L2RS-CS is also formalised to capture the security and privacy requirements to protect transactions in applications to blockchain cryptocurrency protocols, such as the RingCT. To address key-generation security concerns, and to support compression of keys and signatures, the L2RS-CS incorporates a distributed key generation along with a solid public-key aggregation. Finally, we prove the security of our constructed L2RS-CS in the random oracle model and the standard lattice-based Module-SIS hardness assumption.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Lattice-Based Cryptography, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Privacy-Preserving Protocols, Cryptocurrencies, Threshold Signatures, RingCT

Date: received 15 Sep 2020, last revised 15 Sep 2020

Contact author: wil_alberto at hotmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200921:081636 (All versions of this report)

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