Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1105

Catalic: Delegated PSI Cardinality with Applications to Contact Tracing

Thai Duong and Duong Hieu Phan and Ni Trieu

Abstract: Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) allows two parties, each holding a set of items, to learn the size of the intersection of those sets without revealing any additional information. To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first protocol that allows one of the parties to delegate PSI-CA computation to untrusted servers. At the heart of our delegated PSI-CA protocol is a new oblivious distributed key PRF (Odk-PRF) abstraction, which may be of independent interest.

We explore in detail how to use our delegated PSI-CA protocol to perform privacy-preserving contact tracing. It has been estimated that a significant percentage of a given population would need to use a contact tracing app to stop a diseases spread. Prior privacy-preserving contact tracing systems, however, impose heavy bandwidth or computational demands on client devices. These demands present an economic disincentive to participate for end users who may be billed per MB by their mobile data plan or for users who want to save battery life. We propose Catalic (ContAct TrAcing for LIghtweight Clients), a new contact tracing system that minimizes bandwidth cost and computation workload on client devices. By applying our new delegated PSI-CA protocol, Catalic shifts most of the client-side computation of contact tracing to untrusted servers, and potentially saves each user hundreds of megabytes of mobile data per day while preserving privacy.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Private Set Intersection Cardinality, Contact Tracing, Linkage Attack

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2020

Date: received 14 Sep 2020

Contact author: nitrieu at asu edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200915:112843 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1105


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