Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1097

How to Build Optimally Secure PRFs Using Block Ciphers

Benoît Cogliati and Ashwin Jha and Mridul Nandi

Abstract: In EUROCRYPT '96, Aiello and Venkatesan proposed two candidates for $ 2n $-bit to $ 2n $-bit pseudorandom functions (PRFs), called Benes and modified Benes (or mBenes), based on $ n $-bit to $ n $-bit PRFs. While Benes is known to be secure up to $ 2^n $ queries (Patarin, AFRICACRYPT '08), the security of mBenes has only been proved up to $ 2^{n(1-\epsilon)} $ queries for all $ \epsilon > 0 $ by Patarin and Montreuil in ICISC '05. In this work, we show that the composition of a $ 2n $-bit hash function with mBenes is a secure variable input length (VIL) PRF up to $ 2^{n-2} $ queries (given appropriate hash function bounds). We extend our analysis with block ciphers as the underlying primitive and obtain two optimally secure VIL PRFs using block ciphers. The first of these candidates requires $ 6 $ calls to the block cipher. The second candidate requires just $ 4 $ calls to the block cipher, but here the proof is based on Patarin's mirror theory. Further, we instantiate the hash function with a PMAC+/LightMAC+ like hash, to get six candidates for deterministic message authentication codes with optimal security.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PRF, MAC, Benes, modified Benes, PMAC+, LightMAC+

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2020

Date: received 11 Sep 2020, last revised 12 Sep 2020

Contact author: ashwin jha1991 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200915:111906 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1097


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