Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1096

Far Field EM Side-Channel Attack on AES Using Deep Learning

Ruize Wang and Huanyu Wang and Elena Dubrova

Abstract: We present the first deep learning-based side-channel attack on AES-128 using far field electromagnetic emissions as a side channel. Our neural networks are trained on traces captured from five different Bluetooth devices at five different distances to target and tested on four other Bluetooth devices. We can recover the key from less than 10K traces captured in an office environment at 15 m distance to target even if the measurement for each encryption is taken only once. Previous template attacks required multiple repetitions of the same encryption. For the case of 1K repetitions, we need less than 400 traces on average at 15 m distance to target. This improves the template attack presented at CHES'2020 which requires 5K traces and key enumeration up to $2^{23}$.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Side-channel analysis, EM analysis, far field EM emissions, profiled attack, deep learning, AES

Original Publication (with minor differences): 4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security (ASHES’2020), November 13, 2020
DOI:
10.1145/3411504.3421214

Date: received 11 Sep 2020

Contact author: dubrova at kth se

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200915:111844 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1096


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