Paper 2020/1093

Mind the Propagation of States New Automatic Search Tool for Impossible Differentials and Impossible Polytopic Transitions (Full Version)

Abstract

Impossible differentials cryptanalysis and impossible polytopic cryptanalysis are the most effective approaches to estimate the security of block ciphers. However, the previous automatic search methods of their distinguishers, impossible differentials and impossible polytopic transitions, neither consider the impact of key schedule in the single-key setting and the differential property of large S-boxes, nor apply to the block ciphers with variable rotations. Thus, unlike previous methods which focus on the propagation of the difference or $$-difference, we redefine the impossible differentials and impossible $$-polytopic transitions according to the propagation of state, which allow us to break through those limitations of the previous methods. Theoretically, we prove that traditional impossible differentials and impossible $$-polytopic transitions are equivalent to part of our redefinitions, which have advantages from broader view. Technically, we renew the automatic search model and design an SAT-based tool to evaluate our redefined impossible differentials and impossible $$-polytopic transitions efficiently. This tool is capable of searching for impossible differentials and impossible $$-polytopic transitions not only in the single-key setting but also in the related-key setting. As a result, for GIFT64, we get the $$-round impossible differentials which cannot be detected by all previous tools. For PRINTcipher, we propose the first modeling method for the key-dependent permutation and key-dependent S-box. For MISTY1, we derive 902 4-round impossible differentials by exploiting the differential property of S-boxes. For RC5, we present the first modeling method for the variable rotation and get 2.5-round impossible differentials for each version of it. We also get the results of impossible differentials for GIFT, CHAM and SPECK in related-key setting. More remarkable, our tool can be used to evaluate the security of given cipher against the impossible differentials, and we prove that there exists no 5-round 1 input active word and 1 output active word impossible differentials for AES-128 even consider the relations of 3-round keys. Besides, we also get the impossible $$-polytopic transitions for PRINTcipher, GIFT64, PRESENT, and RC5, all of which can cover more rounds than their corresponding impossible differentials as far as we know.