Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1084
Fully Collision-Resistant Chameleon-Hashes from Simpler and Post-Quantum Assumptions
David Derler and Stephan Krenn and Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig
Abstract: Chameleon-hashes are collision-resistant hash-functions parametrized
by a public key. If the corresponding secret key is known, arbitrary collisions for the hash can be found.
Recently, Derler et al. (PKC '20) introduced the notion of fully collision-resistant chameleon-hashes.
Full collision-resistance requires the intractability of finding collisions,
even with full-adaptive access to a collision-finding oracle. Their construction combines simulation-sound extractable (SSE)
NIZKs with perfectly correct IND-CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes.
We show that, instead of perfectly correct PKE, non-interactive commitment schemes are sufficient. For the first time, this gives rise to efficient instantiations from plausible post-quantum assumptions and thus candidates of chameleon-hashes with strong collision-resistance guarantees and long-term security guarantees. On the more theoretical side, our results relax the requirement to not being dependent on public-key encryption.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Chameleon-hash
Original Publication (with major differences): SCN 2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_21
Date: received 9 Sep 2020
Contact author: david at dfinity org, stephan krenn@ait ac at, kaispapers@gmail com, daniel slamanig@ait ac at
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20200910:063738 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1084
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