Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1084

Fully Collision-Resistant Chameleon-Hashes from Simpler and Post-Quantum Assumptions

David Derler and Stephan Krenn and Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig

Abstract: Chameleon-hashes are collision-resistant hash-functions parametrized by a public key. If the corresponding secret key is known, arbitrary collisions for the hash can be found. Recently, Derler et al. (PKC '20) introduced the notion of fully collision-resistant chameleon-hashes. Full collision-resistance requires the intractability of finding collisions, even with full-adaptive access to a collision-finding oracle. Their construction combines simulation-sound extractable (SSE) NIZKs with perfectly correct IND-CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes.

We show that, instead of perfectly correct PKE, non-interactive commitment schemes are sufficient. For the first time, this gives rise to efficient instantiations from plausible post-quantum assumptions and thus candidates of chameleon-hashes with strong collision-resistance guarantees and long-term security guarantees. On the more theoretical side, our results relax the requirement to not being dependent on public-key encryption.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Chameleon-hash

Original Publication (with major differences): SCN 2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_21

Date: received 9 Sep 2020

Contact author: david at dfinity org, stephan krenn@ait ac at, kaispapers@gmail com, daniel slamanig@ait ac at

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200910:063738 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1084