Paper 2020/106

Relaxed freshness in component authentication

Frank Schuhmacher

Abstract

We suggests a relaxed freshness paradigm for challenge-response authentication for each field of application where challenger and responder are tightly coupled and authentication takes place in a friendly environment. Replay attacks are not feasible under this premise, and freshness can be relaxed to relative freshness: no refresh is required as long as all previously tested responders were authentic. One field of application is anti-counterfeiting of electronic device components. The main contribution is a formal security proof of an authentication scheme with choked refresh. A practical implication is the lifetime increase of stored challenge-response-pairs. This is a considerable advantage for solutions based on hardware intrinsic security. For solutions based on symmetric keys, it opens the possibility to use challenge-response-pairs instead of secret keys by the challenger – a cheap way to reduce the risk of key disclosure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
AuthenticationChallenge-Reponse-PairsFormal verificationEprover
Contact author(s)
frank schuhmacher @ segrids com
History
2020-02-04: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/106
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/106,
      author = {Frank Schuhmacher},
      title = {Relaxed freshness in component authentication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/106},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/106}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/106}
}
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