Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1053

Circuit Amortization Friendly Encodings and their Application to Statistically Secure Multiparty Computation

Anders Dalskov and Eysa Lee and Eduardo Soria-Vazquez

Abstract: At CRYPTO 2018, Cascudo et al. introduced Reverse Multiplication Friendly Embeddings (RMFEs). These are a mechanism to compute $\delta$ parallel evaluations of the same arithmetic circuit over a field $\mathbb{F}_q$ at the cost of a single evaluation of that circuit in $\mathbb{F}_{q^d}$, where $\delta < d$. Due to this inequality, RMFEs are a useful tool when protocols require to work over $\mathbb{F}_{q^d}$ but one is only interested in computing over $\mathbb{F}_q$. In this work we introduce Circuit Amortization Friendly Encodings (CAFEs), which generalize RMFEs while having concrete efficiency in mind. For a Galois Ring $R = GR(2^{k}, d)$, CAFEs allow to compute certain circuits over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ at the cost of a single secure multiplication in $R$. We present three CAFE instantiations, which we apply to the protocol for MPC over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ via Galois Rings by Abspoel et al. (TCC 2019). Our protocols allow for efficient switching between the different CAFEs, as well as between computation over $GR(2^{k}, d)$ and $\mathbb{F}_{2^{d}}$ in a way that preserves the CAFE in both rings. This adaptability leads to efficiency gains for e.g. Machine Learning applications, which can be represented as highly parallel circuits over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ followed by bit-wise operations. From an implementation of our techniques, we estimate that an SVM can be evaluated on 250 images in parallel up to $\times 7$ more efficiently using our techniques, compared to the protocol from Abspoel et al. (TCC 2019).

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / MPC, Galois Rings, information-theoretic security

Date: received 31 Aug 2020, last revised 31 Aug 2020

Contact author: anderspkd at cs au dk, eduardo@cs au dk, eysa@ccs neu edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200901:082753 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1053


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