Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1052

Attacking Threshold Wallets

Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Omer Shlomovits

Abstract: Threshold wallets leverage threshold signature schemes (TSS) to distribute signing rights across multiple parties when issuing blockchain transactions. These provide greater assurance against insider fraud, and are sometimes seen as an alternative to methods using a trusted execution environment to issue the signature. This new class of applications motivated researchers to discover better protocols, entrepreneurs to create start-up companies, and large organizations to deploy TSS-based solutions. For example, the leading cryptocurrency exchange (in transaction volume) adopted TSS to protect some of its wallets.

Although the TSS concept is not new, this is the first time that so many TSS implementations are written and deployed in such a critical context, where all liquidity reserves could be lost in a minute if the crypto fails. Furthermore, TSS schemes are sometimes extended or tweaked to best adapt to their target use case---what could go wrong?

This paper, based on the authors' experience with building and analyzing TSS technology, describes three different attacks on TSS implementations used by leading organizations. Unlike security analyses of on-paper protocols, this work targets TSS as deployed in real applications, and exploits logical vulnerabilities enabled by the extra layers of complexity added by TSS software. The attacks have concrete applications, and could for example have been exploited to empty an organization's cold wallet (typically worth at least an 8-digit dollar figure). Indeed, one of our targets is the cold wallet system of the biggest cryptocurrency exchange (which has been fixed after our disclosure).

Category / Keywords: applications / threshold signature, reshare, zero-knowledge, proofs

Date: received 31 Aug 2020, last revised 31 Aug 2020

Contact author: jeanphilippe aumasson at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200901:082728 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1052


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