Paper 2020/1040
MoSS: Modular Security Specifications Framework
Abstract
Applied cryptographic protocols have to meet a rich set of security requirements under diverse environments and against diverse adversaries. However, currently used security specifications, based on either simulation (e.g., `ideal functionality' in UC) or games, are monolithic, combining together different aspects of protocol requirements, environment and assumptions. Such security specifications are complex, error-prone, and foil reusability, modular analysis and incremental design. We present the Modular Security Specifications (MoSS) framework, which cleanly separates the security requirements (goals) which a protocol should achieve, from the models (assumptions) under which each requirement should be ensured. This modularity allows us to reuse individual models and requirements across different protocols and tasks, and to compare protocols for the same task, either under different assumptions or satisfying different sets of requirements. MoSS is flexible and extendable, e.g., it can support both asymptotic and concrete definitions for security. So far, we confirmed the applicability of MoSS to two applications: secure broadcast protocols and PKI schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2021
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_2
- Keywords
- provable-security
- Contact author(s)
-
amirherzberg @ gmail com
leibo hemi @ gmail com
ewa syta @ trincoll edu
sara wrotniak @ uconn edu - History
- 2023-08-04: last of 5 revisions
- 2020-08-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1040
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1040, author = {Amir Herzberg and Hemi Leibowitz and Ewa Syta and Sara Wrotniak}, title = {{MoSS}: Modular Security Specifications Framework}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1040}, year = {2020}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_2}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1040} }